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Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochas-
tic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both
models traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is
mutually bene¯cial, but occasionally they make mistakes. The models di®er in the
probability of mistakes. When all mistakes are equally likely, the set of stochasti-
cally stable allocations contains the set of e±cient allocations. When more serious
mistakes are less likely, the stochastically stable states are those allocations, always
e±cient, with the lowest envy-level. Journal of Economic Literature Classi¯cation
Numbers: C7, D51, D61, D63.
Keywords: stochastic stability, exchange, housing problem, e±ciency, envy.
21 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has proposed new interesting concepts and tools of analysis.
One of these concepts (see, for example, Freidlin and Wentzell [7] and Foster and Young
[6]) is known as stochastic stability. This di®ers from the notions of local stability in
dynamical systems or evolutionary stability in theoretical biology, which require from a
population to be immune to isolated random shocks or mutations. In contrast, stochastic
stability requires immunity against persistent random shocks.
There is a vast literature on stochastic stability. For example, the concept has been
successfully applied to learning processes in normal form games by Kandori, Mailath and
Rob [11], Young [15] and Ellison [4], and in extensive form games by NÄ oldeke and Samuel-
son [13] and later by Hart [9]. In addition, Young [16] uses the same methodology in a
cooperative bargaining problem, and Vega-Redondo [14] in an oligopoly of ¯rms. Recently,
Jackson and Watts [10] study the stochastic stability of networks. As Young [17] stresses
and the above (incomplete) list of papers demonstrates, the stochastic stability approach
can be applied to the analysis of a wide variety of social interactions. Note, however, that
the literature is concerned mainly with the evolution of strategies in games.
In this paper we are interested in applying stochastic stability to general exchange
economies. As a ¯rst step of inquiry, we concentrate on the simple housing market in-
troduced by Shapley and Scarf [12]. This simple environment describes pure barter of
indivisible goods yet important issues concerning e±ciency, envy and decentralization can
be analyzed. Speci¯cally, a housing market consists of n traders, each of whom is charac-
terized by the only house he owns and by his preference relation over the set of houses. In
order to apply stochastic stability, we endow the housing market with a simple perturbed
stochastic dynamic process. The unperturbed process can be described as follows. At each
period a pair of traders is matched randomly and they trade their endowments if and only
if trade is mutually bene¯cial (therefore, myopia is a component of their behavior). In ad-
dition, this process is perturbed. The perturbation consists of allowing a small probability
of trade when it is not mutually bene¯cial. We shall refer to this event as a mistake. In
applying stochastic stability to such a market, we shall be concerned with the evolution of
its allocations, and not with the evolution of the agents' actions. That is, we are interested
in understanding which allocations will be visited a positive proportion of time in the very
1long run.
As argued by Bergin and Lipman [2], the conclusions of the analysis are sensitive to
the particular perturbation chosen. We analyze two perturbed processes that seem very
natural. In the ¯rst, all mistakes made by a given agent are equally likely. In the second,
more serious mistakes are less likely than less serious ones.
Within the ¯rst dynamic model, we show that the e±cient allocations are always
stochastically stable. Although there are economies where the inclusion is strict, we ¯nd
several interesting classes of housing problems where the set of stochastically stable states
and the set of e±cient allocations coincide.2 The fact that every e±cient allocation is
stochastically stable relies on the following interesting property of e±cient allocations. For
any two e±cient allocations it is possible to move from one to the other by means of a
sequence of bilateral trades, without ever passing through an ine±cient allocation. This
\connectedness" property of e±cient allocations allows us to prove also that it is always
possible to move from any allocation, not necessarily e±cient, to any e±cient allocation
by means of a sequence of bilateral trades, at each of which at most one trader makes
a mistake. More mistakes are needed, however, to end up at an allocation that is not
stochastically stable.
As for the second perturbed process, we show that stochastic stability always yields
a subset of e±cient allocations. Indeed, the stochastically stable states are exactly those
allocations where the envy level in the economy is minimized. The intuition behind this
result relies on the tight connection existing between the di®erence in envy-levels of any
two \pairwise connected" allocations and the di®erence between the seriousness of the
mistakes made by the agents when moving from one allocation to the other. In addition,
the limit distribution of our process represents a random allocation that is ordinally e±cient
(Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3]), i.e., it is not ¯rst-order stochastically dominated by any
other random allocation.
Therefore, in an exchange procedure subject to persistent small probability mistakes,
pairwise trade is not in con°ict with Pareto e±ciency. If all mistakes have the same
2For deterministic pairwise (and t-wise) trading processes that yield Pareto e±cient allocations in a
pure exchange economy, see Feldman [5] and Goldman and Starr [8]. Agents in these processes trade in
pairs (or in groups of size t) if there are myopic gains from trade. However, they do not make mistakes in
our sense.
2probability, the economy spends a positive fraction of time in the long run on each e±cient
allocation (and under some extra conditions, only on those). In the absence of those extra
conditions, ine±ciencies are also selected in the long run. When agents are more careful of
avoiding serious mistakes, the economy spends a positive proportion of time in the long run
only on those allocations, always e±cient, where the level of envy is the lowest possible.
We ¯nd it appealing that such concepts, of a strong normative °avor, receive support from
this novel approach to the problem.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and introduces pre-
liminaries. Section 3 studies the ¯rst perturbed process and contains a subsection devoted
to su±cient conditions guaranteeing that all stochastically stable states are e±cient. The
second process is the subject of Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Preliminaries
A house allocation problem is a triple hN;H;(ºi)i2Ni where N is a ¯nite set of individuals,
H is a ¯nite set of houses with jHj = jNj, and for each individual i 2 N, ºi is a complete,
transitive and antisymmetric preference relation over H. The size of the problem is the
number of agents in it.
Let P be a house allocation problem. An allocation in P is a one to one function
x : N ! H that assigns one house to each agent. An allocation x is e±cient if there is no
allocation y such that yi ºi xi for all i 2 N and yi Âi xi for some i 2 N. We denote the set
of e±cient allocations in P by E(P). Let x be an allocation in P. We say that individual i
envies individual j at x whenever xj Âi xi. De¯ne the envy-graph of allocation x to be the
directed graph whose vertices are the agents in the housing problem and there is an edge
from agent i to agent j if and only if i envies j. The envy-level of allocation x is de¯ned
to be the number of edges in its envy graph. We denote the envy-level at x by e(x). It is
clear that allocation x is e±cient if and only if the corresponding envy-graph is acyclic.
Let ¼ : f1;:::;ng ! N be an ordering of the traders, i.e., ¼(1) is the ¯rst trader,
¼(2) is the second trader and so on. We say that allocation x is the outcome of the serial
dictatorship mechanism with respect to ¼ or that x is induced by ¼, for short, if
² x¼(1) is agent ¼(1)'s most preferred element in H, and
3² for t 2 f2;:::;ng, x¼(t) is agent ¼(t)'s most preferred element in Hnfx¼(1);:::;x¼(t¡1)g.
It is known that allocation x is e±cient if and only if it is the outcome of the serial
dictatorship mechanism with respect to some ordering of the traders (see, for example
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1], Lemma 1).
We shall de¯ne a dynamic process according to which agents perform bilateral trades.
These bilateral trades will allow us to transit from one allocation to another. Clearly, it
is not always possible to go from one allocation to another by means of a single bilateral
trade. When it is possible, we say that the allocations are pairwise connected. More
formally, we say that allocations x and y are pairwise connected if there is a pair i and j
of agents such that xi = yj, xj = yi and xk = yk for all k = 2 fi;jg. A (x;y)-path is a ¯nite
sequence of allocations (z0;z1;:::;zk) such that z0 = x, zk = y and for t = 0;1;:::;k ¡ 1,
zt and zt+1 are pairwise connected.
The following proposition shows that the set of e±cient allocations is \connected".
This result, of interest in its own right, will be instrumental in the sequel.
Proposition 1 Let P = hN;H;(ºi)i2Ni be a house allocation problem and let x and y
be two e±cient allocations in P. Then, there is an (x;y)-path consisting exclusively of
e±cient allocations.
Proof : The proof is by induction on the size of the problem. If the problem consists of
one agent, there is nothing to prove because the only allocation is e±cient. Assume that
the claim holds for all problems of size K, let P = hN;H;(ºi)i2Ni be a problem of size
K + 1 and let x and y be two e±cient allocations in it.
Case 1: There is an agent, k 2 N, who gets his most preferred house both at x and y.
Namely, xk = yk ºk h for all h 2 H. Then, there are orderings ¼ and ¾ of the traders,
both with trader k as their ¯rst element, which induce allocations x and y, respectively.
Let N0 = N nfkg, H0 = H nfxkg and consider the subproblem P 0 = hN0;H0;(ºi jH0)i2N0i,
where ºi jH0 is the restriction of i's preferences to H0. The restricted allocations xjN0
and yjN0 are e±cient in P 0 since they are induced by the orderings ¼ and ¾ respectively,
restricted to the agents in N0. Since P 0 is a problem of size K, by the induction hypothesis,
there is a path (^ x0;:::; ^ xm) of e±cient allocations in P 0 from xjN0 to yjN0. De¯ne now the






i if i 2 N0
xk if i = k
for t = 0;:::;m. The sequence (x0;:::;xm) is a (x;y)-path of e±cient allocations in P
since they are induced by the orderings that induce (^ x0;:::; ^ xm), respectively, after adding
agent k as their ¯rst element.
Case 2: There is no agent that gets his most preferred house both at x and at y. In
this case there are orderings ¼ and ¾ of the traders which induce allocations x and y,
respectively. Let ` and k be the ¯rst agents in the orders ¼ and ¾, respectively. Namely
¼(1) = ` and ¾(1) = k. Clearly, ` 6= k.
Case 2.1: Agent `'s and agent k's respective top ranked houses di®er. This implies that
there is an allocation z, which is e±cient in P, and at which both agent ` and agent k get
their respective most preferred houses. Since agent ` gets his most preferred house both at
the e±cient allocation x and at the e±cient allocation z, by case 1, there is a (x;z)-path
of e±cient allocations. But since k gets his most preferred house both at z and at y, by
case 1 again there is a (z;y)-path of e±cient allocations. Joining both paths, we conclude
that there is a (x;y)-path of e±cient allocations.
Case 2.2: Agents ` and k have the same top ranked house. In this case, x awards agent
` this house. Consider an ordering ¹ of the agents in which agent ` is ¯rst and agent k
is last and let z be the e±cient allocation induced by that ordering. Since agent ` gets
his most preferred house both at x and at z, by case 1, there is a (x;z)-path of e±cient
allocations. Let z0 be the allocation that is obtained from z after agents ` and k switch
houses. Allocation z0 is e±cient because it is induced by the ordering that is obtained
from ¹ after ` and k switch their places. Therefore, z and z0 are two pairwise connected
e±cient allocations. Clearly, z0 awards agent k his most preferred house. Therefore, by
case 1 again, there is a (z0;y)-path of e±cient allocations. We have built then a path of
e±cient allocations that connects x with y. 2
Given a house allocation problem we want to de¯ne a perturbed Markov process as
in Young [17]. The states of the process are the allocations of the housing problem. In
5each period one pair of agents is selected at random and the system moves from one state
to another when the matched agents trade. In the unperturbed Markov process, agents
do not make mistakes in each meeting: they trade if and only if there are mutual gains
from trade in the match. In the perturbed process, agents will make mistakes with a small
probability. We denote a generic perturbed process by M².
It is often the case that the unperturbed Markov process has many stationary distri-
butions. On the other hand for all ² 2 (0;1), the perturbed process M² is ergodic, which
implies that it has a unique stationary distribution. Denote the unique stationary dis-
tribution of M² by ¹². This stationary distribution, which is independent of the intimal
allocation, represents the proportion of time that the system will spend on each of its states
in the long run. It also represents the long run probability that the process will be at each
allocation. In order to de¯ne the stochastically stable states, we check the behavior of the
stationary distribution ¹² as ² goes to 0. It is known that lim²!0 ¹² exists and further it
is one of the stationary distributions of the unperturbed process. The stochastically stable
states of the system M² are de¯ned to be those states that are assigned positive probability
by this limit distribution. These are the allocations that are expected to be observed in
the long run `most of the time'.
3 All Mistakes Are Equally Likely
Given a house allocation problem, consider ¯rst the following stochastic process, whose
states are the allocations of the problem. In each period one pair of agents is selected
at random. Each pair is chosen with arbitrary positive probability. Consider a pair of
individuals, say i and j. The probability that they trade depends on the degree of ad-
vantageousness of the trade. If this is mutually bene¯cial, then it takes place with high
probability, say 1. If the trade is not mutually bene¯cial, then it takes place with a very
low probability. Speci¯cally, assume that if the trade is advantageous for only one trader,
it takes place with probability ² and if the trade is disadvantageous for both traders, it
takes place with probability ²2. We denote this process by M²
1.
De¯ne the unperturbed process M0 to be the one just speci¯ed, but where the proba-
bility of making mistakes is zero. It can be checked that a state of the unperturbed process
M0 is absorbing if and only if there is no pair of agents that envy each other. As shown in
6the next proposition, it turns out that the absorbing states constitute the only recurrent
classes of the process.
Proposition 2 The recurrent classes of the unperturbed process M0 are the singletons
containing the absorbing states.
Proof : It is clear that a singleton containing an absorbing state is a recurrent class.
Conversely, assume that x is an allocation where there are at least two agents i and j that
envy each other. Then, with positive probability they will meet and trade. As a result,
allocation x0 arises, where x0
i = xj Âi xi, x0
j = xi Âj xj, and xk = x0
k for every k 6= i;j.
Thus, the envy-level at x is higher than the envy-level at x0. Since, by the law of motion
of the unperturbed process, the envy-level cannot increase, once the process arrives at x0,
there is zero probability that it will return to x, which shows that x does not belong to a
recurrent class. 2
Note that each e±cient allocation is an absorbing state of the unperturbed Markov
process M0, but in principle so are many other ine±cient allocations. Note also that if the
problem has more than one absorbing state, then M0 has many stationary distributions.
Let P be a house allocation problem. We are interested in the stochastically stable
states S1(P) of the perturbed Markov process M²
1 de¯ned above. In order to calculate them,
we will use the characterization of the stochastically stable states provided by Young [15]
and Kandori, Mailath and Rob [11], based on the techniques developed by Freidlin and
Wentzell [7].
For any two allocations x and y, de¯ne the resistance of the transition x ! y as follows:
if x and y are pairwise connected, then the resistance is the number of agents (0, 1, or
2) that ¯nd the bilateral trade unpro¯table. Otherwise de¯ne the resistance to be 1.
Similarly, let » = (z1;:::;zk) be an (x;y)-path. The resistance of the path » is the sum of
the resistances of its transitions.
Let Z0 = fz1;:::;zqg be the set of absorbing states of the unperturbed process and
consider the complete directed graph with vertex set Z0, which is denoted by ¡. We want
to de¯ne the resistance of each one of the edges in this graph. For this, let zi and zj be
two elements of Z0. The resistance of the edge (zi;zj) in ¡ is the minimum resistance over
7all the resistances of the (zi;zj)-paths. Note that while zi and zj are two absorbing states,
(zi;zj)-paths are typically composed of any kind of allocations, not necessarily absorbing.
Let zi be an absorbing state. A zi-tree is a tree with vertex set Z0 such that from
every vertex di®erent from zi, there is a unique directed path in the tree to zi.3 The
resistance of the zi-tree is the sum of the resistances of the edges that compose it. The
stochastic potential of the absorbing state zi is the minimum resistance over all the zi-
trees. Young [15] showed that the set of stochastically stable states of the process consists
of those states with minimum stochastic potential.
The following lemma, an equivalent version of which is stated in NÄ oldeke and Samuelson
[13] (see their Lemma 4) will be useful in later proofs.
Lemma 1 Let x be a stochastically stable state and let y be an absorbing state such that
the edge (x;y) has resistance 1. Then, y is a stochastically stable state.
Proof : Let T be an x-tree with minimum resistance over all the x-trees. Let s(y) denote
the immediate successor of y in the unique path in T that connects y to x. Consider the
tree T 0 that is built by deleting from T the edge (y;s(y)) and adding the edge (x;y). It can
be seen that T 0 is a y-tree. Indeed, if there was a directed path in T from z to y, the same
path connects z to y in T 0. And if there was a directed path in T from z to x that did not
go through y, now the path that is obtained from that path by adding the edge (x;y), is
a directed path in T 0 that connects z to y. The tree T 0 is a y-tree that is obtained from
T by adding an edge of resistance 1 and deleting one edge of resistance greater or equal
1. Therefore, the resistance of T 0 is no greater than the resistance of T. But since T is an
x-tree with minimum resistance over all the x-trees and since x is a stochastically stable
state, the resistance of T 0 equals the resistance of T and therefore y is a stochastically
stable state. 2
The following corollary is an application of Proposition 1 in NÄ oldeke and Samuelson
3It will be convenient to distinguish between a path in a tree that connects x to y, and a (x;y)-path.
The former is a sequence of edges in a tree (with vertex set Z0), and the latter is a sequence of allocations,
as de¯ned in the previous section.
8[13].4
Corollary 1 If there is an e±cient allocation that is stochastically stable in M²
1, then so
are all e±cient allocations.
Proof : Let x be an e±cient allocation that is stochastically stable and let y be another
e±cient allocation. By Proposition 1, there is a (x;y)-path of e±cient allocations. By the
de¯nition of M²
1, every edge along this path has resistance 1. By Lemma 1, all the e±cient
allocations along this path, and in particular allocation y, are in S1(P). 2
Corollary 1 still leaves the door open to no e±cient allocation being stochastically
stable. The following theorem, our ¯rst main result, shows that this is not the case. Thus,
all e±cient allocations are visited a positive proportion of time by the process M²
1 in the
long run.
Theorem 1 Let P be a house allocation problem. The set of stochastically stable alloca-
tions S1(P) contains the set of e±cient allocations E(P).
Proof : Given Corollary 1, it is enough to show that there is one e±cient allocation that
is stochastically stable. Pick a stochastically stable allocation x. If x is e±cient, we are
done. Therefore, assume x is not e±cient. It su±ces to show that there is a path from x
to an e±cient allocation such that each of its transitions has resistance less or equal to 1,
because, by Lemma 1, the e±cient allocation will be stochastically stable. The existence
of the required path is an immediate consequence of the next lemma. Prior to it, some
de¯nitions are required.
For any allocation z, let A1(z) be the set of agents that are allocated their most preferred
house under allocation z and let B1(z) be its complement:
A1(z) = fi 2 N : zi ºi zj 8j 2 Ng
B1(z) = N n A1(z):
4To see this, note that our Proposition 1 says that all the e±cient allocations belong to the same
component.
9De¯ne recursively the following sets of agents: for k = 1;2;:::
Ak+1(z) = fi 2 Bk(z) : zi ºi zj 8j 2 Bk(z)g
Bk+1(z) = Bk(z) n Ak+1(z):
Let A(z) = [1
k=1Ak(z) and B(z) = N n A(z).
For any allocation z, it is immediate that the agents in A(z) do not belong to any cycle
of the envy-graph of z. It is also clear that no agent in A(z) envies any agent in B(z).
Finally, note that B(z) = ; if and only if z is e±cient.
Lemma 2 Let x be an absorbing state that is not e±cient and let jB(x)j = m. Then,
there is an absorbing state y such that the edge (x;y) has resistance 1 and for which
jB(y)j < m.
Proof : Let x be an ine±cient absorbing state with jB(x)j = m. (Note that m ¸ 3).
Let i 2 B(x). Then there is an agent in B(x) who is envied by i. Let j be the agent who
owns the ºi-maximal house in the set of houses that belong to agents in B(x). That is,
xj ºi xt for all t 2 B(x). Let x0 be the allocation that is obtained from x after i and j
trade. At this allocation, no agent in A(x) [ fig envies any agent in B(x) n fig. In fact,
A(x) [ fig µ A(x0), and therefore, jB(x0)j < m. If x0 is absorbing, then we are done:
let y = x0. If x0 is not absorbing, there is a (x0;y)-path of resistance 0 from x0 to some
absorbing state y. Clearly, jB(y)j · jB(x0)j < m. 2
By repeated applications of Lemma 2, we can build a path from x to an absorbing state z
with B(z) = ;, which means that z is e±cient. This completes the proof of the theorem.
2
As a consequence of Lemma 2 we get the following characterization of the z-trees that
attain the minimum stochastic potential.
Lemma 3 Assume that a house allocation problem has k > 1 absorbing states and let
z be a stochastically stable allocation in S1(P). Any z-tree whose resistance attains the
stochastic potential of z is composed of k vertices and k ¡ 1 edges of resistance 1.
10Proof : Any z-tree with the set of absorbing states as vertex set has k vertices and
k ¡1 edges. Therefore we need to show that each of the edges of a z-tree that attains the
stochastic potential has resistance 1. Let z be a stochastically stable allocation.
Case 1: z is e±cient. We shall build a z-tree whose edges have resistance 1. For this, we
¯rst draw one outgoing edge of resistance 1 from each absorbing state z0 di®erent from z as
follows. If z0 is an absorbing and ine±cient state, then by Lemma 2, there is an absorbing
state z00 such that the transition z0 ! z00 has resistance 1 and jB(z00)j < jB(z0)j. By adding
the edge (z0;z00) and possibly proceeding in the same way if z00 is ine±cient, we construct a
directed graph such that each one of its connected components is a tree that has a unique
e±cient allocation. Further, this unique e±cient allocation is the root of that tree. In
order to complete the z-tree we need to connect the e±cient allocations to z using one
outgoing edge from each e±cient allocation di®erent from z. But by Proposition 1 this
can be done.
Case 2: z is ine±cient. By case 1 and Theorem 1, the minimum stochastic potential is
k ¡ 1. Since z stochastically stable, its stochastic potential is also k ¡ 1. Further, any
z-tree has k¡1 edges with resistance greater or equal 1. Therefore, each edge of any z-tree
that attains z's stochastic potential has resistance 1. 2
As we have established in Theorem 1, all e±cient allocations are selected by stochastic
stability when applied to the bilateral trading process M²
1. It is important, though, to point
out that there are house allocation problems where the inclusion reported in Theorem 1 is
strict, as the following example shows.
Example 1 Consider the following 4-agent problem:
h1 º1 h4 º1 h2 º1 h3
h1 º2 h2 º2 h3 º2 h4
h2 º3 h3 º3 h4 º3 h1
h3 º4 h4 º4 h1 º4 h2
Consider the following allocations.
11Agents
Allocation 1 2 3 4
z0 h1 h2 h3 h4
z1 h2 h1 h3 h4
Table 1: Two absorbing states
It can be easily checked that allocation z0 is an e±cient allocation: it is induced by
the natural ordering of the players. Therefore, by Theorem 1, z0 is stochastically stable.
On the other hand, z1 is an ine±cient absorbing state: the only cycle in its envy-graph


























But since z0 and z1 are pairwise connected (with agents 1 and 2 trading), the transition
z0 ! z1 has resistance 1. Therefore, by Lemma 1 z1 is stochastically stable.
As the previous example shows, there are house allocation problems where the set of
stochastically stable allocations contains strictly the set of e±cient allocations. In the
next subsection, we investigate restrictions on the house allocation problems that assure
12that every stochastically stable allocation is e±cient. It may be skipped without loss of
understanding of the sequel.
3.1 When Stochastic Stability Implies E±ciency
This subsection identi¯es three su±cient conditions that render equality between S1(P)
and E(P). It closes with a more general result that suggests a procedure to generate
housing problems where the same property holds.
Proposition 3 Let P be a house allocation problem with a unique e±cient allocation.
There is only one stochastically stable state in S1(P), the e±cient allocation.
Proof : Note that if there is a unique e±cient allocation x, then at x each agent gets
his top-ranked house. Therefore, any edge that exits x has resistance 2. By Lemma 3, no
allocation other than x is stochastically stable. 2
Thus, if preferences are su±ciently diverse so that each agent has a di®erent top-ranked
house, our pairwise procedure with mistakes selects only e±cient allocations. A second
simple class of problems with the same property is the following:
Proposition 4 Let P be a problem with at most 3 agents. The set of stochastically stable
allocations S1(P) is the set of e±cient allocations E(P).
Proof : For problems with one or two agents, the statement is trivially true. Let P be a
problem with 3 agents, and let z be an ine±cient absorbing state in it. Therefore z's envy






Namely, there are no two agents with the same top-ranked house. But this means that
in this economy, there is a unique e±cient allocation. By Proposition 3, it is the only
stochastically stable one. 2
In order to provide another class of problems where there is equality between S1(P)
and E(P), we need the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 1 Let P = hN;H;(ºi)i2Ni be a house allocation problem and let < be a
complete order of the houses in H. We say that P has the single-peak property with
respect to < if for every i 2 N there is a house h(ºi) 2 H such that for all h;h0 2 H,
[h < h
0 · h(ºi) or h(ºi) · h
0 < h] implies h
0 Âi h:
An example of a problem with the single-peak property is one where all agents have
identical preferences, but one could think of many other examples. Now we state the
following:
Proposition 5 Let P = hN;H;(ºi)i2Ni be a house allocation problem that has the single-
peak property. Then, the set of stochastically stable allocations S1(P) is the set of e±cient
allocations E(P).
Proof : Since the set of absorbing states is a superset of the set of stochastically stable
states, which in turn contains the set of e±cient allocations, it su±ces to show that all
absorbing states are e±cient. Hence, consider an ine±cient allocation z. We shall show
that it is not absorbing. The envy graph of z has at least one cycle. Choose a cycle with
a minimal number of agents. Without loss of generality assume that the minimal cycle
14is composed of NK = f1;2;:::;Kg µ N and that agent 2 envies 1, ..., agent K envies
K ¡ 1, and agent 1 envies K. Since there is no smaller subcycle, each trader in the cycle
has its second best house out of the houses in z(NK) = fz1;:::;zKg. Assume that P has
the single-peak property and let < be the corresponding ordering of H. Let zk be the ¯rst
house in z(NK) according to <. That is, zk < zj for all j 6= k. Restricting attention to
houses in z(NK), agent k's top-ranked house is zk¡1 (modulo K) and his second best house
is zk. Therefore, we must have that zk¡1 is zk's immediate successor in z(NK) according
to <. Also, zk is k +1's (modulo K) top-ranked house while zk+1 is his second best house.
Consequently zk+1 also must be zk's immediate successor in z(NK). Therefore zk¡1 = zk+1
which implies that K = 2. Namely, NK = f1;2g and agents 1 and 2 envy each other at z.
Hence, z is not absorbing. 2
In order to get a more general result of constructive nature, consider the following
de¯nition.
De¯nition 2 Let P 1 = hN1;H1;(ºi)i2N1i and P 2 = hN2;H2;(ºi)i2N2i be two house
allocation problems such that N1 \ N2 = ; and H1 \ H2 = ;. De¯ne P 1 ¤ P 2 to be the
family of problems hN;H;(º0
i)i2Ni such that:
² N = N1 [ N2;
² H = H1 [ H2;
² for each i 2 N and for `;k 2 f1;2g, if i 2 N` then for all h 2 H` and h0 2 Hk:
(
h º0
i h0 if k 6= `
h º0
i h0 , h ºi h0 if k = `:
The essential feature of a problem in P 1 ¤ P 2 is that every agent in N`, for ` = 1;2,
prefers any house in H` to any house in Hk, for k 6= ` and that ºi is the restriction
of º0
i to H`. The following proposition suggests a technique to generate larger problems
satisfying S1(P) = E(P) by \composing" simpler problems where the same equality holds.
For example, this can be done by combining housing problems, each satisfying one of the
three su±cient conditions identi¯ed earlier in this subsection.
15Proposition 6 Let P 1 = hN1;H1;(ºi)i2N1i and P 2 = hN2;H2;(ºi)i2N2i be two house
allocation problems such that N1 \ N2 = ; and H1 \ H2 = ;. Assume that for both
problems, the set of stochastically stable allocations of M²
1 coincides with the set of e±cient
allocations. Then the same is true for every problem in P1 ¤ P2.
Proof : Let P = hN;H;(º0
i)i2Ni 2 P 1 ¤ P 2.
Lemma 4 Let z = (z1;z2) = ((zi)i2N1;(zj)j2N2) be an allocation in P. Then, z is e±cient
in P if and only if z1 = (zi)i2N1 and z2 = (zj)j2N2 are e±cient allocations in P 1 and P 2,
respectively.
Proof : Note ¯rst that if z1 2 E(P 1) and z2 2 E(P 2) are e±cient allocations induced
by ¼ and ¾ respectively, then z is induced by the ordering (¼;¾) of N where the agents
in N1, ordered according to ¼, are followed by the agents in N2, ordered according to ¾.
Secondly, if z is an e±cient allocation in P induced by an ordering ¿, then by the way the
preferences (º0
i)i2N are de¯ned (see De¯nition 2), it is clear that z(Nt) = Ht for t = 1;2.
That is, z1 and z2 are allocations in P 1 and P 2, respectively. Moreover, they are e±cient
since they are induced by ¿ restricted to each subproblem. 2
We need to show that every stochastically stable allocation in P is also e±cient in P. So
let y = (y1;y2) be a stochastically stable allocation in P and let ¡y be a y-tree that attains
the minimum stochastic potential. Assume by contradiction that y is not e±cient and let
x = (x1;x2) be an e±cient allocation in P. By lemma 4, x(N1) = H1 and x(N2) = H2.
Consider the unique (x;y)-path in ¡y. We claim that at each allocation along this path
every agent in N1 gets a house in H1 and every agent in N2 gets a house in H2. For if
there was an edge (z;z0) in this path from allocation z to allocation z0, where z(Nk) = Hk
for k = 1;2 but z0(Nk) 6= Hk for k = 1;2, this edge would have a resistance grater than
1, which by Lemma 3 contradicts the fact that y is stochastically stable. As a result,
the (x;y)-path induces a (x1;y1)-path and a (x2;y2)-path in the subproblems P 1 and P 2,
respectively. But this paths are composed by edges of resistance 1. Therefore, since x1 and
x2 are stochastically stable in P 1 and P 2 respectively, by Lemma 1 allocations y1 and y2
are stochastically stable in P 1 and P 2, respectively. But by assumption, E(P k) = S(P k)
16for k = 1;2 which implies that y1 and y2 are e±cient allocations in P 1 and P 2, respectively.
By Lemma 4 then, y = (y1;y2) is e±cient in P. 2
4 Serious Mistakes Are Less Likely
We now turn to a second perturbed dynamic process, denoted by M²
2, of the same unper-
turbed process M0. In order to de¯ne the transition probabilities we need some notation.
Consider the pair consisting of agents i and j, and let hi and hj be their houses before
they trade. De¯ne
ni = jfh 2 H : hi Âi h ºi hjgj;
and
nj = jfh 2 H : hj Âj h ºj higj:
Namely, ni is the number of houses that agent i considers at least as good as house hj and
worse than hi, and nj is the number of houses that agent j considers at least as good as
house hi and worse than hj. At a transaction between agents i and j, we shall say that
agent i makes a mistake of order ni and agent j of order nj. Notice that if as a result of
this trade, agent k gains (k = i;j), nk = 0.
The dynamic process is described as follows. As before, each pair is chosen with
arbitrary positive probability. Once they are chosen, the probability that agents i and
j trade is ²ni+nj. In words, if trade is mutually bene¯cial, it takes place with probability
1. If it is not, then it takes place with a probability that depends on the seriousness of the
mistakes made. An individual is much more careful of not making bad mistakes.
Note again that the unperturbed process, i.e., the version of this process when ² = 0, is
the same unperturbed process M0 as before. Therefore, Proposition 2 continues to apply
here.
Within the new perturbed dynamic process M²
2, the resistance of a transition x ! y
should be rede¯ned as follows: If x and y are pairwise connected, then the resistance
is ni + nj where i and j are the agents who trade houses. If x and y are not pairwise
connected, then, as before, the resistance is de¯ned to be 1.
Note that if x and y are pairwise connected, then the resistance of the transition x ! y
17is the number of directed edges in the envy-graph of y that are not in the envy-graph of x:
if, in going from x to y, agent i makes a mistake of order ni and agent j of order nj, there
will be ni + nj additional directed edges in the envy-graph of y that were not present in
the envy-graph of x. This observation allows us to prove the following useful result.
Lemma 5 Let z;z0 2 Z0 be two absorbing states and let r(z;z0) and r(z0;z) be the
resistance of the edges (z;z0) and (z0;z), respectively. Then, r(z0;z)¡r(z;z0) = e(z)¡e(z0).
Proof : Let (z0;z1;:::;zK) be a (z;z0)-path of minimum resistance. That is, r(z;z0) =
PK¡1
k=0 r(zk;zk+1), where r(zk;zk+1) denotes the resistance of the transition zk ! zk+1.
Similarly, consider the (z0;z)-path (zK;:::;z1;z0) and denote the resistance of the transi-











where the inequality follows because, in going from z0 to z, we are following the reverse
path of going from z to z0 (while in principle there could exist a cheaper path). Now,
since for k = 0;:::;K ¡ 1, zk and zk+1 are pairwise connected, the resistance r(zk;zk+1)
is exactly the number of directed edges in the envy-graph of zk+1 which are not in the
















k+1)] = e(z) ¡ e(z
0):
By an analogous argument, if z0;z1;:::;zJ is a (z0;z)-path of minimum resistance and










The above two inequalities imply that r(z0;z) ¡ r(z;z0) = e(z) ¡ e(z0). 2
18The following theorem characterizes the set S2(P) of stochastically stable allocations
of the process M²
2.
Theorem 2 Let P be a house allocation problem. The set of stochastically stable alloca-
tions S2(P) is the set of allocations with minimum envy level. Furthermore, it is a subset
of the set of e±cient allocations E(P).
Proof : Let x be stochastically stable in the process M²
2 and let y 6= x be an allocation
with minimum envy level (if there is no such y, then x is the only allocation with minimum
envy-level and we are done). Therefore e(y) · e(x). Since x is stochastically stable, there is
an x-tree with minimum stochastic potential. We shall construct a y-tree with a resistance
no greater than that of the x-tree.
The y-tree consists of the following directed edges. If edge (z;z0) is an edge in the
x-tree that does not belong to the unique directed path in that tree that connects y to x,
then (z;z0) also belongs to the y-tree. If edge (z;z0) does belong to the unique path that
connects y to x in the x-tree, then (z;z0) is deleted and replaced with (z0;z), that is, the
edge is reversed. Note that the graph so constructed is indeed a y-tree: it is a tree because
it is a connected graph with the same number of edges as the x-tree; it is a y-tree because
if a (z;y)-path was in the x-tree, it remains in the y-tree, whereas if it was not, there is
now a (z;y)-path either via x or as a subpath of the (x;y) path just built. We are going
to show that the resistance of this y-tree, denoted by R(y), is no greater than that of the
x-tree, denoted by R(x). Let f(z0;z1);:::;(zk¡1;zK)g be the unique path in the x-tree
that connects y to x (where z0 = y and zK = x). Letting r(z;z0) be the resistance of the
edge (z;z0), by the construction of the y-tree we have








By Lemma 5 we have that r(zk+1;zk) ¡ r(zk;zk+1) = e(zk) ¡ e(zk+1). Therefore,





k+1)] = e(y) ¡ e(x) · 0:
19But R(y)¡R(x) ¸ 0 because x has minimum stochastic potential. Hence, R(y)¡R(x) =
e(y) ¡ e(x) = 0, from which it follows that:
(i) y has minimum stochastic potential, and that
(ii) x has minimum envy level.
To complete the proof, we need to show that if x has minimum envy level, it is e±cient.
If it were not e±cient, its envy-graph would contain a cycle. Eliminating the cycle by letting
its agents trade leads to an allocation with a lower envy level. 2
Remark: As shown in Theorem 2, the support of the limit distribution of the process M²
2
consists of the set of allocations of minimum envy level, itself a subset of the set of e±cient
allocations. The limit distribution can be regarded as a random allocation: the distribution
represents the likelihood of being at each of the states in the long run. Although the
support of this distribution consists solely of e±cient allocations, one may ask whether the
distribution itself is ordinally e±cient in the sense de¯ned by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3].
That is, it may happen that another random allocation ¯rst-order stochastically dominates
the limit distribution of the process; in this case, all agents whose preferences over lotteries
satisfy monotonicity in ¯rst-order stochastic dominance would prefer the former random
allocation to the latter.
To understand the concept of ordinal e±ciency, consider the following 4-agent example:
h1 º1 h2 º1 h3 º1 h4
h1 º2 h2 º2 h3 º2 h4
h2 º3 h1 º3 h4 º3 h3
h2 º4 h1 º4 h4 º4 h3
Consider the random allocation that results from the following mechanism: each of the
24 possible serial dictatorship mechanisms is chosen with equal probability. Note that
the support of the resulting random allocation is the set of e±cient allocations. One
can check that in this random allocation each agent receives his top ranked house with
probability 5/12, his second ranked house with 1/12, his third ranked house with 5/12 and
his fourth ranked house with probability 1/12. But this random allocation is not ordinally
20e±cient, because it is ¯rst-order stochastically dominated by the random allocation that
assigns (h1;h3;h2;h4) and (h3;h1;h4;h2), each with equal probability: under this random
allocation, each agent receives his top ranked and third ranked houses with probability
1/2.
It follows from Theorem 2 that the limit distribution of the process M²
2 is ordinally
e±cient, namely it is not ¯rst-order stochastically dominated by any other random alloca-
tion. This is so because it assigns positive probability only to allocations with minimum
envy level. That is, the resulting lottery minimizes the expected envy, i.e., maximizes the
sum of the agents' expected utilities, where each agent is endowed with the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function given by the negative of his envy.
If one endows the agents with a cardinal utility that associates to each allocation
the negative of his envy, then Theorem 2 shows that the stochastically stable allocations
are those that maximize the sum of the utilities. One may wonder whether this result
continues to hold under di®erent cardinal representations of the same preferences. The
answer is negative, because under alternative cardinalizations of preferences, the analog of
Lemma 5 will generally fail to hold. On the other hand, Theorem 2 and its interpretation
in terms of selecting the maximizers of the sum of utilities would still go through for
utility representations fi(ni), as long as they satisfy that ni + nj ¸ n0
i + n0
j if and only if




The ¯rst welfare theorem states that competitive allocations are e±cient. Further, it is also
known that competitive allocations from equal division are envy-free. We can interpret
these results as saying that when rational agents have equal endowments and trade with
an anonymous market, the resulting outcome is e±cient and envy-free. Our results show
that, in some models of exchange, pairwise trade where agents make mistakes with small
probability leads the economy to e±ciency and minimum envy in the long run. It is good
news, we believe, to ¯nd this very di®erent underpinning of such well established concepts.
An open question. On the other hand, another leading solution concept in this
problem is the competitive equilibrium (which always yields a unique allocation in this
context, and coincides with the core). An important question, raised ¯rst by Vega-Redondo
21[14], is whether one can ¯nd evolutionary support to Walrasian allocations. He succeeds in
doing this in an imitation process applied to the Cournot oligopoly model, a game in normal
form. In an exchange economy, though, the competitive equilibrium is obviously sensitive
to the initial endowments. As a result, it is not clear how a solution with this property
could be selected by a methodology based on ergodic processes, which are independent of
initial conditions. Nonetheless, this is an important question that deserves further thought.
The speed of adjustment. For every ² > 0, the invariant distribution of M²
1 and that
of M²
2 represent the long run behavior of the two systems. An important question concerns
the speed of adjustment of each system to these long run predictions. A related issue is
the average waiting time for the system to reach one of the stochastically stable states. In
particular, how the average waiting time depends on the size of the housing problem. The
answer to these questions is not simple because the set of allocations changes fundamentally
with the size of the problem. Not only does the number of allocations increase but also
the number of absorbing states typically goes along with it. However, Lemma 3 allows us
to say that, for M²
1, the average time that it takes for the system to leave any absorbing
allocation, whether stochastically stable or not, is independent of the number of agents
in the problem and it depends linearly on 1=². This is not the case for M²
2, where the
average time to leave some non-stochastically stable absorbing states may be of the order
1=²ni+nj for high values of ni and nj. Thus, we can conclude that the average time that
takes the system to reach a stochastically stable state is smaller in the ¯rst model than
in the second. Further, we can say that this average time depends polynomically on the
number of non-stochastically absorbing states of the problem. We do not know, however,
how this number grows with the size of the problem.
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